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The Fairness Myth
Victor M. Earle, III*
Accounting firms are increasingly the targets of suits brought
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.' While
it has not yet been determined whether a cohesive body of law will
emerge-there are significant differences among and within the circuits-the thrust of some recent opinions is toward a redefinition of
the role of the auditor, focusing upon his responsibility to those who
are potential investors and lenders rather than upon his responsibility to his client, the existing body of shareholders.
Today when an auditor is called upon to make a difficult accounting judgment, he is aware that any decision he makes may
result in an action that could impose substantial, perhaps ruinous
damages upon him and his firm. If the accountant is to carry out
successfully his assumed obligations both to the investing public
and to existing shareholders (an attempt to redefine the role of the
accountant must still recognize the traditional relationship between
accountant and client), 2 he needs a legal standard of liability that
is something more than a collection of the adventitious, random
decisions of judges and juries who are untrained in accounting matters.
The accounting profession has enlarged its efforts to establish
bodies of generally accepted auditing standards and accounting
principles to guide the accountant in conducting his audit and expressing his professional opinion. Although there is always a need
for narrowing alternative accounting principles and developing additional authority, the existing bodies of accounting and auditing
literature offer the auditor substantial guidance in determining
whether he should give an opinion on the financial statements of a
client, how he should arrive at that opinion, and in what form that
opinion should be expressed.
The courts have generally encouraged the auditor to adhere to
these professional standards by shielding him from liability when he
*Member of the New York Bar and general counsel to the accounting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. The author expresses his gratitude to James Moss of the New York
Bar, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, q (1970); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1974). Although § 11 of the 1933 Act is not technically an antifraud provision, it is treated
as such in this discussion.
2. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
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does. Judge McLean expressed this attitude in writing that
"[a]ccountants should not be held to a standard higher than that
recognized in their profession." ' Other decisions, however-in particular United States v. Simon' and, recently, Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Kreskstein, Horwath and Horwath5-can be read to suggest
that the liability of accountants will be judged by a vague lay standard of fairness rather than the criteria systematically developed by
the accounting profession. That is to say that an accountant may
be found to have violated the law notwithstanding his adherence to
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles; he
must also undertake to do whatever it is that the trier of fact may
later deem to be "fair." If a fairness test were adopted by the courts,
the ramifications of requiring such clairvoyance in auditors would
be far-reaching-subverting the efforts of the profession to establish
uniform standards of accounting and distorting the already exaggerated public expectations concerning the purpose of an accountant's
report. I submit that the Simon decision does not in fact call for a
fairness standard of liability, and that such dicta to the contrary in
the Herzfeld opinion are simply wrong. These two opinions must be
read against the entire body of case law adjudicating accountants'
liability: that an auditor may not be held liable for damages when
in good faith he has acted in accordance with the relevant auditing
standards and accounting principles generally accepted by his profession.
THE

AuDTrrOR's ROLE

UNDER THE SECURITIES

LAws'

The independent auditor's responsibility (and liability) to the
investing public is thought to arise out of those provisions of the
3. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See
also Hochfelder, 503 F.2d at 1108. This is equally true of doctors and lawyers. Doff v. Relles,
355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (lawyers); Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(doctors).
4. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
5. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,547 (S.D.N.Y. May 29,
1974).
6. Common law cases are excluded from this discussion because there was never any
doubt as to the standard of care. An accountant was liable to his client for negligence, and
negligence meant the failure to perform with the due care commonly exercised by other
members of the same profession. This liability was limited primarily to clients. Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Even with the latter-day attempts to
expand the accountant's common-law liability to third parties, no court has even hinted that
good faith compliance with professional standards would not be an absolute defense. See, e.g.,
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968). The debate has centered instead
on whether such expanded liability should require gross negligence, knowledge of falsity, or
mere ordinary negligence (as originally defined in the first-party suits brought by clients)
coupled with foreseeability as to relying third persons.
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federal securities laws that require financial statements filed
thereunder to be accompanied by the report of an independent public accountant.7 Beyond the requirement of independence, the securities laws do not specifically define the duties of the public accountant. Pursuant to Regulation S-X, the SEC's basic accounting
regulation, the accountant's report accompanying the registrant's
financial statements shall (i) state whether the audit was conducted
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and designate any omitted auditing procedures and the reasons for their
omission; (ii) state the accountant's opinion on the accompanying
financial statements and the accounting principles and practices
reflected therein, and his opinion on consistency or material change;
and (iii) identify any matters to which the accountant has taken
exception, and state the effect of each exception on the financial
statements.8
Although the Commission has the authority to formulate the
accounting principles to be applied by registrants in the preparation
of their financial statements, it has exercised this authority only
sparingly by issuing occasional accounting releases. In general, the
SEC has been satisfied to let the accounting profession develop
7. 15 U.S.C. §77aa(26) (1970). The initial draft of the Securities Act of 1933 contained
a provision calling for the use of government auditors to review financial statements filed
pursuant to the Act. Congress rejected that proposal, however, in favor of one providing for
examination by "independent public or certified accountants." The SEC has assumed this
requirement also applies to certain filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
extent of accountants' liability, if any, under the 1934 Act is, to say the least, unclear.
8. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. §210.2-02(b), (c), as amended (1974). It is a common
misconception of many lawyers and businessmen that an accountant "certifies" the objective
accuracy of every numerical figure appearing in the financial statements. The SEC has never
expected the accountant to be a guarantor of the accuracy of the financial information
appearing in his client's financial statements. The Commission, the accounting profession,
and the courts have recognized that it would be impractical, even impossible, for independent
accountants to conduct 100% examinations of their clients' transactions and countless journal
and ledger entries. Even if such a total examination were carried out by the auditor, there is
no way he could be completely assured that all of his client's business transactions were
recorded and therefore verifiable or that collusion had not occurred between the client and
third parties.
Simply stated, it is unrealistic to expect that an auditor can "certify" in any absolute
sense the accuracy of the statistical representations contained in financial statements. The
company, not its auditors, makes financial statement representations to the public, and the
responsibility for their accuracy must lie with it. See, e.g., In re Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
4 S.E.C. 706, 721 (1936); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 62 (June 27, 1947); AICPA,
Committee on Auditing Procedure, Statement No. 1, at 10 (1939); AICPA, Committee on
Auditing Procedure, Statement No. 33, at 9-10 (1963); SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
378 F. Supp. 430, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Pollack, J.) (". . . an accountant is not a guarantor
of the reports he prepares and is only duty bound to act honestly, in good faith and with
reasonable care in the discharge of his professional obligations. .

. ."

Id. at 440).
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these principles for the business community. From the outset, the
Commission has expressly relied upon the profession:
In cases where financial statements filed with this Commission pursuant to its
rules and regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are prepared in accordance with accounting principles for
which there is no substantial authoritative support, such financial statements
will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate despite disclosures contained
in the certificate of the accountant or in footnotes to the statements provided
the matters involved are material. In cases where there is a difference of opinion between the Commission and the registrant as to the proper principles of
accounting to be followed, disclosure will be accepted in lieu of correction of
the financial statements themselves only if the points involved are such that
there is substantial authoritative support for the practices followed by the
registrant and the position of the Commissioner has not previously been expressed in rules, regulations, or other official releases of the Commission, including the published opinions of its chief accountant.'

The "authoritative support" necessary to overcome this negative
presumption is general acceptance by the accounting profession."
GAAS AND GAAP
As recognized by Regulation S-X, the accounting profession has
articulated a body of "generally accepted auditing standards"
(GAAS) and "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP). It
is intended that the application of these standards and principles
in appropriate situations will, as nearly as possible, result in financial reporting that is not misleading.
The profession's generally accepted auditing standards guide
the accountant in the conduct of his audit and in the preparation
of his report. Such standards may be technical rules of procedure
or fundamental statements of objectives and policy. In actual appli9. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (Apr. 25, 1938); cf. SEC Accounting Series
Release No. 62 (June 27, 1947).
10. See RAPPApoRT, SEC: AccoUNTING PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE 3.1-3.9 (3d ed. 1972);
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1151, 1177 (1970). To be sure, the Commission has criticized the accounting profession,
prodded it into action and even taken exception to some of its pronouncements. By and large,
however, it has encouraged the profession to exercise leadership in developing the authoritative literature.
On the other hand, the Commission has not always cooperated with individual members
of the profession when they are conducting audits. In SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
Judge Pollack's memorandum opinion of October 18, 1974, criticizes the Commission for
having withheld from the 2 accounting firm defendants information that might have been
material to their examination:
Unless the SEC's pronouncements of cooperation with public accountants in the interests of providing full and understandable disclosure to the investing public are to be
taken as mere exercises in public relations, the SEC must genuinely indicate that cooperation is indeed a two-way street. Surely the SEC would not choose to have accountants
judge it by the percept 'do as I do, not as I say.'

(Opinion at 8).
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cation they deal with such matters as how to draft and implement
the audit program, how to conduct tests and checks to verify the
internal accounting controls of the client, how to decide what opinion is to be expressed in the auditor's report (an unqualified or
"clean" opinion, a qualified opinion, an adverse or negative opinion,
or a disclaimer of opinion) and how to express that opinion. Auditing standards gain "authoritative support" through formal adoption
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).
The Committee on Auditing Procedures of the AICPA has issued
and reissued statements on auditing standards and policy that
guide the auditor in selecting and applying auditing procedures."
Whereas auditing standards are directed toward the accountant and guide him in the conduct of his audit and preparation of
his report, accounting principles are directed toward management
and deal with the proper method of recording the results of economic operations in concise, comprehensible financial statements.
These principles incorporate the current consensus concerning
which economic resources and obligations should be recorded as
assets and liabilities; which changes in assets and liabilities should
be reflected; when these changes should be reflected; how the operations, assets and liabilities, and changes in them should be measured; what financial information should be disclosed and how it
should be disclosed; and which financial statements should be prepared. They include broad guidelines of general application as well
as detailed practices and procedures. 2
11. The profession first attempted to standardize auditing pmcedures in the wake of
the Commission's McKesson & Robbins investigation (SEC Accounting Series Release No.
19 (1940)), which exposed the unsettled state of auditing standards for verification of inventories and receivables. In 1940, the Committee on Auditing Procedure issued Statement on
Auditing Procedure No. 1, thereby establishing procedures for observation of inventories and
confirmation of receivables. In 1947, 1951, 1954, and 1963 (with Statement No. 33), the
Committee consolidated its prior pronouncements into one authoritative exposition of auditing standards. In 1973, the Committee (now the Auditing Standards Executive Committee)
incorporated statements 33-54 into its Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 (SAS No. 1).
The auditing standards set forth in SAS No. 1 have been fully supported by the SEC. See
ASR No. 153; Liggio, Expanding Concepts of Accountant's Liability, CAIH. CPAQ. 23 (Sept.
1974).
12. AICPA, Accounting Principles Board ("APB"), Accounting Principles §1026.01-.02
(1970). The short form accountant's report refers to financial statements which "present fairly
the financial position of X company. . . in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles." The APB has defined this phrase to mean that these financial statements meet
the following conditions:
(1) Generally accepted accounting principles applicable in the circumstances have been
applied in accumulating and processing the financial accounting information, (2)
changes from period to period in generally accepted accounting principles have been
appropriately disclosed, (3) the information in the underlying records is properly reflected and described in the financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
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The Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the AICPA and now
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have attempted
to establish a uniform set of specific accounting principles, binding
upon members of the profession and dealing with all areas of financial accounting. 13 The potentially infinite number of financial situations, of course, precludes comprehensive coverage by the FASB. In
untouched areas, and even in some of the areas previously treated
by APB opinions, accounting principles attain "authoritative" status by convention-that is, by agreement (often tacit) among certified public accountants and within the business community. Thus,
a prerequisite to the exercise of sound professional judgment by the
auditor is a thorough, up-to-date knowledge of acceptable accounting practices.
THE AuDrroR's LImrB'rY TO His CLIENTS

The accountant is ordinarily retained by a company for the
purpose of rendering an opinion that the shareholders, investors,
creditors, and the Commission (if the company is a registrant) will
consider to be a reasonable assurance that the financial statements
of the company upon which the opinion is rendered are not misleading. The SEC has effectively acknowledged that the accountant's
report is appropriate if based on an audit that complies with generally accepted auditing standards and that the registrant's .financial
statements are not misleading when they conform to generally accepted accounting principles. 4 The terms of the accountant's engagement, which presumably are the source of liability to his client,
will ordinarily require him to conduct his audit in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. If he fails in a material way
to follow these professional standards, the auditor may be liable for
accounting principles and (4) a proper balance has been achieved between the conflicting needs to disclose important aspects of financial position and results of operation in
accordance with conventional concepts and to summarize the voluminous underlying
data into a limited number of financial statement captions and supporting notes.
APB Accounting Principles §1027.15, at 356 (1970).
13. The Institute's efforts to standardize accounting principles date back to 1939, when
it began publishing Accounting Research Bulletins that articulated theoretical and practical
solutions to then-current accounting problems. In 1959, the APB was established to advance
the written expression of generally accepted accounting principles. It has issued Accounting
Principles Board Opinions, many of which have had a major impact on financial accounting.
One of the express goals of the APB was to reduce the areas of difference and inconsistency
in accounting practice. The APB was succeeded in 1972 by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, which is independent of the AICPA and whose composition partly includes
expertise outside the accounting profession. See AICPA, Report of the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles (1972).
14. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (Apr. 25, 1938).
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failure to act with the due care commonly exercised by members of
5
his profession.

This potential liability places considerable pressure on the auditor when he must make close judgments. If he mistakenly decides
that the accounting policies of his client do not conform to generally
accepted accounting principles, he may be sued for the damage
caused by the alleged misjudgment. Every accountant is aware that
his expression of an adverse, qualified, or disclaimer of opinion on
the client's financial statements exposes him to the risk of litigation
if his client subsequently establishes that the company's accounting
policies are authoritatively supported in the professional literature.
This is not an attempt to excuse the accountant who too readily
delivers an unqualified opinion, but to emphasize a consideration
that is too easily overlooked. As matters now stand, the auditor
faces the possibility of suit whichever way he decides: by management, on the one hand, or by third parties, on the other. 6 No other
profession is obliged to pick its way through such a mine field.
THE AuDrOR's LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES

Predictably, the federal courts have generally held that liability
cannot exist if the accountant has complied with generally accepted
auditing standards and insisted that his client adhere to generally
accepted accounting principles.
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,'7 an action based on
Section 11 of the Securities Act, a bowling construction company,
its management, underwriters, and independent auditors were held
liable for material omissions and misstatements in financial statements issued in 1961 in an offering of debentures. Section 11 provides that the independent accountants will be liable for any material omissions, or false or deceptive statements in the expertized
portion of a prospectus'8 unless it can be shown that they pursued a
reasonable course of investigation, and had reasonable grounds to
believe and did believe that the statements were true and contained
no material omissions."
The court specifically held that it would not judge the company's expertized accounting principles by any other criteria than
15. See, e.g., National Surety Corp.v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 2d 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1939); Gormley, Accountants'ProfessionalLiability-A Ten Year Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 1206
(1974).
16. See Earle, Accountants on Trial in a Theatre of the Absurd, FORTUNE, May, 1972.
17. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. 15 U.S.C. §77k(a) (1970).
19. 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (1970).
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those of the accounting profession. For example, although plaintiffs
had attacked the use of the percentage of completion method of
accounting for income, the court upheld the use of this method after
expert testimony confirmed its acceptability for long-term construction contracts. There was no discussion of or investigation into the
"fairness" of this professional judgment. Similarly, as to auditing
standards, the accountants were required to discover only what a
reasonable examination would have revealed. Thus, in the absence
of documentary evidence showing that a cash inflow had been "arranged" by management and was only temporary, the accountants
were not expected to have discovered the true nature of this asset.
On the other hand, the court did impose liability upon the
accountants for not conducting what it considered to be a limited
"S-1 review" in compliance with professional standards:
Peat, Marwick, prepared a written program for such a review. I find that
this program conformed to generally accepted accounting principles [sic].
Accountants should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized
in their profession. I do not do so here. Berardi's review did not come up to
that standard. He did not take some of the steps which Peat, Marwick's written program prescribed. He did not spend an adequate amount of time on a
task of this magnitude. Most20important of all, he was too easily satisfied with
glib answers to his inquiries.

BarChris thus demonstrates that, at least under Section 11, auditors' liability will be determined solely by measuring their perform21
ance against professional standards.
Shahmoon v. GeneralDevelopment Corp.22 involved an unsuccessful challenge to the accounting policies of a Florida land sales
23
company under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
Plaintiffs alleged they had purchased stock in reliance upon false
and misleading information in defendant's 1960 annual report and
1961 prospectus. Specifically, the complaint charged that the
method by which defendant recorded its installment purchase con20. 283 F. Supp. at 701, 703. There has been some criticism of the court's interpretation
of auditing standards so as to require the auditor (Berardi) to do more than he did. See
Sommer, Accountant's Counsel-Advice to My Client, 24 Bus. LAW. 593 (1969). Whether or
not this criticism is justified, it does not reach the court's holding that the test of an
accountant's liability is non-compliance with professional standards.
21. Cf. Norte & Co. v. Huffines, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a suit charging 5 corporate directors with violations §§10(b) and
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. The court held that the
unaudited earnings figures contained in a proxy statement were misleading because they were
not adjusted as required by generally accepted accounting principles.
22. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,308 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
23. The company's auditors were not named as defendants, but the case revolved
around the financial statements reviewed by them.
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tracts (and thereby arrived at figures for accounts receivable and
allowance for contract cancellations) was fraudulent. The standard
against which Judge Carter measured the appropriateness of that
method was identical to the BarChrisstandard: conformity to generally accepted accounting principles.2 4 The court decided which
principles were generally accepted by considering first whether
other Florida land development companies had used these same
accounting methods (most had), and then whether the SEC had
given approval to these methods by act or omission (it had). 2 Perhaps most importantly, Judge Carter refused to consider the expert
testimony of an accounting professor who offered his opinion that
the application of defendant's method of accounting had made the
financial statements misleading and deceptive. Once it had determined that the expert's opinion did not represent the majority view
within the profession, the court rejected his testimony-without so
much as a fleeting comment on whether the majority view was
"fair."
This standard was also used in ColonialRealty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,21Crane Co. v. WestinghouseAir Brake Co., 2 and Kohler
v. Kohler.2' In Colonial Realty, the plaintiff was unsuccessful when
expert testimony at trial established that the method of accounting
used in defendant's prospectus was the method most commonly
employed by other companies in the same line of business. In Crane,
the Second Circuit upheld a finding that the proxy statement of the
24. "Defendant's financial statements and accounting procedures cannot be considered
fraudulent when they conform with generally accepted accounting procedures as that term
is understood by at least a majority of accounting experts in the field and when the methods
used are endorsed by the accounting profession as a whole . . . [D]efendant cannot be
charged with fraud or with misleading the plaintiffs for preparing its financial statements
pursuant to the method presently favored and used in its field. GDC cannot be held to an
individualistic standard at odds with prevailing and accepted accounting yardsticks." [19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,039.
25. The court decided that the SEC had at least tacitly approved GDC's accounting
policies by not questioning them and had probably given affirmative approval when it required a major competitor to adopt them. Id.
In fact, that major competitor, GAC Corporation, and its accountants were also sued for
adhering to these very policies. Spiegler v. Wills, 60 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). A theory of
liability advanced by the plaintiffs in Spiegler was that when the accounting profession (and
therefore GAC) adopted a new method for recording installment sales contracts in 1972, the
previous use of the former method somehow became fraudulent. The complaint was dismissed
for its failure inter alia to state a claim for relief. "It is clear that the mere allegation of a
change in accounting procedure-from one accepted practice to another-is not sufficient in
itself to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, no matter how characterized." Id.
at 682-83.
26. 337 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
27. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wisc. 1962).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

defendant corporation was not misleading, relying upon the expert
testimony in the record that defendant's independent public accountants had complied with professional standards in computing
the level of foreign results and charging foreign currency losses
against income. Similarly, Kohler involved a suit brought against a
company and its auditors attacking the use of the LIFO method of
valuing inventories; the court summarily dismissed the challenge to
this method when the plaintiff conceded that LIFO was generally
accepted in similar circumstances.
Compliance with professional standards, of course, will protect
an accountant only when those standards are relevant to his situation. If he finds the accounting literature silent or unsettled on a
particular point, he will review the current practice and apply his
professional judgment. 9 When the accountant is placed in this position, he will not be judicially second-guessed unless his judgment
was not reasonably intended to avoid a misleading presentation. 0
THE

Simon

CASE (CONTINENTAL VENDING)

United States v. Simon" was a criminal prosecution in which
two partners and an associate in a national firm of public accountants were convicted of mail fraud and violations of the 1934 Act.
The charges stemmed from the report on the 1962 balance sheet of
Continental Vending Machine Corporation. While conducting their
examination of Continental, the auditors became aware that an
affiliated company, Valley Commercial Corporation, was unable at
the time to repay funds it had borrowed from Continental. Valley
had loaned these funds to Harold Roth, president of both Valley and
Continental, for his private use. The auditors knew of these advances to Roth before they issued their opinion on Continental's
financial statements; they also knew that Roth was not then in a
position to repay these advances to Valley. They agreed that if
adequate collateral was posted for the Valley receivable, it would
not be necessary for them to await an audit of Valley's financial
29. For example, in the Kohler case, the innovative use of an "unusual" method of
accounting for pension annuities was approved. The court recognized that the AICPA Committee on Accounting Procedure permitted exceptions to its general rule regarding annuities
due to the unsettled state of professional opinion on the subject. After hearing expert testimony that the treatment used by management and permitted by the defendant accountants
was "acceptable . . in view of the unusual features of the pension plan," the court upheld
the treatment as a "good faith judgment . . . . in the handling of a complex accounting
problem." Id. at 819.
30. Id.; cf. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. at 557 ("There is
no evidence that the accounting judgment utilized in allocating the reserves was clearly wrong
or misleading.").
31. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
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statements. The collateral was posted and consisted of securities
held by Roth and his family; eighty percent of these securities were
common stock and convertible debentures of Continental itself.
Continental's financial statements, including notes, disclosed
the loans to Valley and the fact that these loans were secured by
Valley's equity in "certain marketable securities." While the statements explained that Roth was president, director, and a stockholder of Valley, they did not reveal that he was the ultimate recipient of the loans to Valley. The auditors, on behalf of their firm,
rendered an unqualified opinion on these financial statements. A
few days after the statements were mailed to the stockholders, and
probably as a response to the losses shown in the financial statements, the market for Continental stock collapsed.
The prosecution sought to prove that the defendant accountants had acted fraudulently in expressing their opinion on Continental's financial statements, because the company had failed to
disclose (i) that a substantial part of the collateral for the Valley
receivable consisted of securities of Continental itself; (ii) that the
ultimate beneficiary of the loans was Roth, who had used the funds
for private investment; and (iii) that the Valley receivable had increased after the balance sheet date by 500,000 dollars. Thus the
"primary, predominant and pervasive" issue in the case was the
defendants' failure to insist on a disclosure that Continental's loans
to Valley were not for a business purpose, but to help Roth in his
personal financial problems.
The defendants called eight eminent accounting experts to testify that these disclosures were not required by generally accepted
accounting principles. These expert opinions, however, were not
based upon specific rules or prohibitions in the accounting literature
devoted to the necessity of disclosure in circumstances raising a
suspicion of corporate looting or other mismanagement. Rather, the
experts concluded that since the auditors had honestly believed the
collateral for the Valley loan was adequate, nothing in the financial
statements themselves negated the conclusion that an honest judgment had been made 34-in effect, an opinion not based upon accounting expertise, but on the experts' views of defendants' good
faith. The trial judge refused to give a blanket instruction to the jury
32. The prosecution also attacked the statement in a note implying that a Valley
payable could be offset against the Valley receivable. Defendants (and their experts) con-

ceded this was improperly implied by confusing wording in the note, but contended it was
not an intentional error.
33. 425 F.2d at 806 (quoting from the defendants' brief).
34. Id. at 805-06.
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that it must acquit the defendants if it believed they had complied
with the standards generally accepted by the profession as presented by the eight experts. Instead, he instructed the jurors to
weigh all of the expert testimony, decide whether the principles
rclied upon by the auditors were "authoritative" and then determine whether these principles "contemplate, deal with, and apply
to the type of circumstances found by you to have existed here
"35

Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, upheld this
charge:
We think the judge was right in refusing to make the accountant's testimony
so nearly a complete defense. The critical test according to the charge was the
same as that which the accountant's testified was critical. We do not think the
jury was also required to accept the accountants' evaluation whether a given
fact was material to overall fair presentation, at least not when the accoun-

tants' testimony was not based upon specific rules or prohibitionsto which
they could point."

This passage has been read by some to suggest that a court in
judging the performance of an auditor may substitute its view of
what is material to fair presentation in accordance with GAAP for
that of the accounting profession. This is not, however, what Judge
Friendly said. The experts at trial had not relied upon specific principles to dictate the disclosure necessary in the unusual (and arguably suspicious) circumstances surrounding the Valley receivable.
Instead, the experts first assumed that the defendants had trusted
Roth and the reliability of the collateral, and then testified that the
accounting judgments reflected in the financial statements were
acceptable. As it turned out, this assumption proved false; the jury
must have concluded that the defendants knew the true purpose of
the loans was to enable Roth to loot Continental for his own gain.
In other words, the jury believed the auditors had not acted in good
faith, and hence the question of compliance with GAAP became
37
academic.
35. Id. at 806.
36. Id. (emphasis added). The "critical test" referred to by Judge Friendly-he also
called it the "basic issue" in the case-was: did the defendants make a good faith judgment
in the absence of any authoritative accounting principles precisely governing these circumstances? The reference to "specific rules or prohibitions" is surprising, because it suggests
that even in the presence of bad faith, i.e. an intent to deceive, an accountant could escape
liability by relying upon antaccounting principle exactly on point. Although obviously exculpatory, such a proposition would be contrary to the ethics of the accounting profession. See
AICPA, Code of Professional Ethics, Rule 203 (1973).
37. An earlier jury apparently believed otherwise. The defendants had been tried before
on the same charges but the jury, unable to agree, was discharged, reportedly standing 11-1
for acquittal.
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Thus Simon does not repudiate or draw into question the
BarChrisstandard that an accountant may not be held liable if he
has relied in good faith upon relevant principles generally accepted
by his profession. 3 Far from denigrating generally accepted accounting principles as a standard of conduct, the Simon opinion
seems to encourage their further definition so as to provide specific
guidance to both accountants and courts.
THE

Herzfeld

CASE

3

1

The Herzfeld litigation involved the issue of how much information an accountant must insist be disclosed when he has qualified his opinion on his client's financial statements. The defendant
accounting firm had examined the financial statements of a California real estate syndicate, Firestone Group, Limited, and discovered
that a large acquisition-resale transaction was not properly reported
in FGL's draft financial statements. In November 1969, FGL had
executed contracts by which it purchased certain nursing home
properties for $13,362,500 and then, four days later, sold them for
$15,393,000. FGL had treated this $2 million profit as current income. After an investigation, the auditors concluded that this treatment was improper, since only $25,000 of the $15,393,000 sales price
had actually been received from the purchaser. FGL's management
reluctantly agreed to change its income statement and record
$235,000 of the profit as current income, deferring the remainder."
In the course of the audit the accountants discovered that the purchaser had a net worth of only $100,000. Accordingly, and because
the initial down payment was so small, the accountants concluded
that the collectability of this contract receivable was doubtful. They
therefore decided to qualify their opinion on FGL's financial stateOn November 14, 1974, a jury in another case rejected a good faith defense and returned
a guilty verdict against an audit partner and a former professional employee of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. in connection with an allegedly false proxy statement filed by National
Student Marketing Corporation. Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1974, at 8, col. 2.
38. Actually, this standard of liability did not originate with the BarChrisopinion. In
an earlier criminal case, presenting many of the same issues as appear in Simon, the Second
Circuit, also per Judge Friendly, applied professional standards in order to sustain a conviction against an accountant for securities fraud. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir. 1964). See also United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941), and the common
law cases discussed in note 6 supra.
39. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Kreskstein, Horwath & Horwath [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1974).
40. The $235,000 figure represented a $25,000 down payment already received by
FGL, another $25,000 down payment due within 45 days, and $185,000 in liquidated damages
in the event of default.
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ments although they had already insisted that the bulk of the profit
from the transaction be deferred. FGL's executives strongly disagreed with the defendant's accounting judgment and even threatened to sue the firm if a contemplated private placement of its
securities fell through as a result of the qualification. The auditors
remained adamant and issued their qualified report; the private
placement occurred, but the sale of the nursing home properties did
not. Litigation ensued following FGL's bankruptcy in 1971.
Plaintiffs charged that the entire transaction was a sham devised to cover up a net loss that would have otherwise been reported
in FGL's income statement. It was alleged that the auditors (i)
knew, or should have known, the sham nature of the transaction,
and (ii) should have disclosed in their report all of the circumstances
prompting the qualification. In support of the second allegation,
plaintiffs relied upon a specific AICPA pronouncement on qualified
opinions.4 Although the court rejected plaintiffs' first contention
that the auditors knew the transaction was a sham, it upheld plaintiffs' claim on the strength of the second allegation, concluding that
the auditors had not fully disclosed the reasons for their qualification or the effect this qualification would have upon FGL's financial
42
position .
Assuming, arguendo, that the court correctly held that the auditors failed to make adequate disclosure in their report or to insist
upon fuller disclosure in FGL's financial statements, it automatically follows, in light of SAS No. 1, that they did not comply with
GAAS. Assuming further that this failure was deliberate and its
significance understood, Judge MacMahon should have held for the
plaintiffs solely on this ground.43 Instead, he disregarded profes41. In their post-trial brief at pages 91-93, plaintiffs cited Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33 [now SAP No. 1, §512.01], which provides:
When a qualified opinion is intended by the independent auditor, the opinion paragraph
of the standard short-form report should be modified in a way that makes clear the
nature of the qualification. It should refer specifically to the subject of the qualification
and should give a clear explanation of the reasons for the qualification and of the effect
on financial position and results of operations, if reasonably determinable. Reference in
the opinion paragraph to a note to the financial statements or to a preceding paragraph
in the report that describes the circumstances is an acceptable method of clarifying the
nature of a qualification. ...
42. "[A]dmittedly, Laventhol itself had considerable doubt about the ability of FGL
to collect the balance due on the Continental contract . . . . Thus it was incumbent on
Laventhol to reveal to investors its reservations and doubts concerning consummation of the
transaction and the facts upon which its reservations were based.
"Laventhol claims that its qualification . . .along with Note 4, constituted full disclosure of its reservations. We disagree." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.,
at 96,000.
43. For example, in Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yaun-
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sional auditing standards, calling them "esoteric accounting norms,
comprehensible only to the initiate," and held that the actual test
was whether the report fairly presents the "true financial position
to the untutored eye of an ordinary investor.""
of Firestone .
Another disturbing feature of the Herzfeld opinion is its reliance upon Simon. Simon does not support the extravagant dicta
contained in the Herzfeld opinion, nor is there any apparent authorarticles by individual
ity for this dicta other than speeches and
45
staff.
its
and
Commission
the
of
members
Three months after the Herzfeld decision in an opinion involving another accounting firm the Seventh Circuit, without referring
to Herzfeld, expressly adopted the BarChrisholding that "the standard of care which generally prevailed in the accounting profession
. . .is the standard to which [the defendant accountants] must be
held.""
der & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit was faced with the same
issue; unlike Judge MacMahon, it relied exclusively on the passage from SAP No. 33, quoted
in note 41 supra.
44. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,998 (emphasis added).
For "true" one can apparently substitute the word "fair." Either word, if not defined by
professional criteria, is wholly subjective.
45. See Slain, Fair Presentation, 8 Rlv. SEC. REG. No. 2 (1975) (author accepts broad
reading of Simon while somewhat illogically criticizing Herzfeld result); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws-Some Observations,68 Nw. U.L.
Ruv. 1, 4 (1973); Sommer, Survey of Accounting Developments in the 60's; What's Ahead for
the 70's, 26 Bus. LAw. 207 (1970). Judge MacMahon also cited and quoted from 2 SEC
opinions, In re Associated Gas & Elec., 11 S.E.C. 975 (1942) and Touche, Niven, Bailey-&
Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957). Although one quoted passage refers to "enlightenment" as
the function of financial statements, both opinions suggest that accountants are to be judged
by the generally accepted standards of their profession. For example, in Associated Gas, using
language similar to that employed a generation'later by Judge Friendly in Simon, the Commission stated:
Under the circumstances such as those presented in this case, we hold that Haskins
& Sells have not put themselves in a position to certify; for the statements neither
present the financial condition in accordance with accepted principles of accounting nor
adequately indicate the effects of the practices followed, nor provide the reader with the
means by which he may work out the financial condition for himself.
Bell and Bowman consistently adopted the position that certain practices now
recognized as faulty had not been thought through by the profession when the financial
statements in question were certified and that many of registrant's challenged practices
were accepted practices at the time. To some extent this may be true of specific practices, and wherever true we have recognized it in this opinion. But we should indeed be
loath to believe that it was general practice in the accounting profession at the time of
these statements-or at any time-to certify to financial statements so obviously manipulated to suit the purposes of the registrant as those before us.
11 S.E.C. at 1058.
46. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 1108. "This duty to audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards does not differ from the duty which is otherwise imposed by law . . . or the
accounting profession itself." Id.
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CONCLUSION

Commissioner Sommer has suggested that the accounting profession and its spokesmen are unduly disturbed by the fairness debate, and that eventually the profession will be cofifortable with
such a standard.48 Perhaps Mr. Sommer is confusing the kind of
common sense that ought to be a part of any audit (or, for that
matter, any professional engagement) with the standard of liability
to be applied after the fact by a lay judge or jury. There is simply
too much of the accounting literature, stemming from many years
of incremental development, that would seem arcane, if not bizarre,
to laymen. An example is the basic accrual method of accounting,
which every accountant automatically assumes when examining
corporate financial statements. A layman who wants to know where
the cash receipts are and what expenditures have actually been
made has great difficulty with the concept of income or expense that
has not actually been received or incurred in the sense of an exchange of cash.
This example is particularly useful because the layman's attitude is not entirely without merit. The Trueblood Committee,
which recently reported on objectives of financial statements, suggested that historically the profession had not paid enough attention
to realization, and, in terms of receivables and payables, had not
attempted to differentiate between their immediate and long-term
impact upon cash." The FASB is currently studying this and other
recommendations of the Trueblood Committee. 0 It is one thing,
however, to suggest that the profession, through its accounting "legislature," develop new law to accommodate a new (or newly recognized) reality in the market place; it is quite another to suggest that
when an individual accountant obeys in good faith the existing law,
he can later be found liable for vast sums if twelve (or six) laymen
decide the accounting principle in question was unfair.
Any type of fairness doctrine for liability, no matter how superficially if not seductively appealing, would effectively destroy the
guarantee of professionalism that the securities law and the accounting profession have for so long sought to instill in financial
48. Sommer, Accountants:A Flexible Standard, address to ABA National Institute on
Professional Liability, Montreal, Canada, May 30, 1974, at 13.
49. See generally AICPA, Report of the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial
Statements (1973).
50. Ironically, the impetus for establishment of the FASB was the recognized need for
a broad perspective, drawn in part from without the profession, in the development of accounting principles. If fair reporting is ever to be found, presumably the FASB is the place,
not in ad hoc courtroom determinations.

19751

THE FAIRNESS MYTH

reporting. Without the assurance that accountants are consistently
applying those principles that- find general acceptance within the
accounting profession, the accountant's opinion will mean nothing
to a shareholder, investor, or creditor, unless by some magic he can
personally observe the particular "fairness" bias of the individual
accountant who performed the audit. 51 Instead of enhancing the
stature of the accountant's opinion and the utility and comparability of financial statements, a fairness standard would separate these
heretofore vital documents from the conventional wisdom of an entire profession.
Finally, it is unreasonable to expect any professional to operate
effectively under such an open-ended standard of care. Indeed, at a
time when accountants are already proceeding through a litigation
minefield, this additional burden is inappropriate. Fairness, without further definition, means whatever is attractive or unattractive
to the particular trier of fact. Such a standard is wholly subjective
and unpredictable, varying chaotically according to the
predilections, social conscience, and the like, of the various judges
and juries who would be called upon to apply it. The fairness doctrine, therefore, is not doctrine but myth-and a dangerous myth
at that. One is tempted to suggest that as a standard of liability it
is "unfair."
51. See Carmichael, What Does the Independent Auditor's Opinion Really Mean?, J.
OF AccoUNTANcY, Nov. 1974, at 83-84.

